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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
origin and that it was caused by the plaintiff insured. Evidence
that the fire was of incendiary origin was lacking and proof of
motive was weak, although the circumstances were very sus-
picious.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Paul M. Hebert*
The problem of "connexity" between a finance company and
the dealer as relates to the protection afforded the holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument was before the court in Univer-
sal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Alker,' in an interesting factual setting.
The defendants, Alker and Duvic, affixed their signatures to a
note and chattel mortgage using a form furnished by the finance
company to the vendor, Orleans Motor Company. The note and
chattel mortgage when executed were on one sheet of paper, the
note being detachable by means of perforations. On the face of
the chattel mortgage there was a space designated under the
printed heading "Customer" and this blank had been filled in to
show J'Alkard Enterprises, Inc. This corporation was newly
formed and insolvent at the time of the suit. The two defendants
were officers of the corporation and were sued individually on
the note. Consideration for the note was a ranch wagon pur-
chased for the corporation. The chattel mortgage security could
not be enforced because the vehicle, after its purchase, had been
sent by the corporation to Mexico on business and had not been
returned. The signatures of the two defendants appeared on
both the note and the chattel mortgage without any designation
of capacity other than as individuals. There was nothing in the
note to indicate that the defendants were signing in a representa-
tive capacity. The defense was (1) that defendants subscribed
the note solely for and on behalf of the corporation in their rep-
resentative capacity as officers without intent to be personally
bound thereon; and (2) that the payee motor company was agent
or representative of the plaintiff finance company or was so
identified with the payee that knowledge of the limited purpose
for which defendants were alleged to have signed were imputed
to the finance company under the doctrine of Commercial Credit
Co. v. Childs2 and C.I.T. Corp. v. Emmons.3
*Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 239 La. 1057, 121 So.2d 78 (1960).
2. 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260, 128 A.L.R. 726 (1940).
3. 197 So. 662 (La. App. 1940).
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On the facts it was established that the note and mortgage
were executed by defendants in the presence of the payee's sales-
man and the note was endorsed and sent by messenger to the
plaintiff's office. A crucial fact in dispute was whether the
plaintiff actually knew of the alleged infirmity. On this issue
the Supreme Court found that plaintiff had in fact informed the
payee's salesman that it would not accept the financing of a car
for a newly formed corporation unless two individual signatures
were given. From this fact, from the individual form of the
signatures, and from the general corroborative evidence, the
court concluded that the individual signatures were given as
demanded by the finance company for the purpose of creating
personal liability and that plaintiff had no knowledge of any
agreement or understanding that the corporation and not the de-
fendants were to be the obligor. The defendant whose case was
on appeal strongly contended that the plaintiff was so closely
connected with the entire transaction that knowledge of the al-
leged equities between the original parties should be imputed to
the plaintiff. The Supreme Court flatly rejected this contention
and adhered to the rule of actual knowledge laid down in White
System of New Orleans v. Hall.4 The court again specifically
repudiated the line of cases headed by Commercial Credit Co. v.
Childs,5 the leading American authority finding identity between
the payee-vendor and the endorsee-finance company to the point
of transferring the payee's knowledge in a manner to defeat
holder in due course status.
This reaffirmation of the requirement that bad faith must be
"actual knowledge" of the infirmity is a salutary result as the
situation here involved is quite different from the degree of
actual knowledge found to be present in C.I.T. Corp. v. Emmons.6
4. 219 La. 440, 53 So.2d 227 (1951) (finance company holder purchased note
from seller for value in good faith and before maturity without notice that sold
equipment was defective; held, finance company not subject to defenses that buyer
might have against seller. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Swain, 176 So.
636 (La. App. 1937); C.I.T. Corp. v. Emmons, 197 So. 662 (La. App. 1940);
International Harvester Co. v. Carruth, 23 So.2d 473 (La. App. 1945) ; and Citi-
zens Loan Corp. v. Robbins, 40 So.2d 503 (La. App. 1949) distinguished).
5. 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940) ; Clark v. Roberts, 206 Mass. 235,
92 N.E. 461 (1910) ; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works,
34 Cal.2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950) ; Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649,
44 A.L.R.2d 1 (Fla. 1953). The Childs case and its aftermath is discussed in
Comment, 18 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 322, 327 (1958).
6. 197 So. 662 (La. App. 1940) (facts established finance company had full
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The principal case also correctly applies the rule of Section 20
of the Negotiable Instruments Law in holding that avoidance of
personal liability can only be achieved by clearly disclosing the
principal and signing in a representative capacity.7 An exami-
nation of the note showed that no principal was disclosed on it
and no representative capacity was indicated in the note. The
decision that the typed blank indicating the corporation as "Cus-
tomer" did not meet the test of Section 20 seems entirely sound.
The case as a whole strengthens considerably the holder in due
course protection as applied to the dealer-finance company rela-
tionship and is in keeping with the policy of freeing the holder
in due course from equities between the original parties. The
case may mark a more definite trend away from the questionable
result of the Emmons case.8
In O'Rourke v. Moore,9 a written document was sued on under
allegations that plaintiff "is the holder in due course and for
value of an acknowledgment of a debt and/or negotiable instru-
ment" signed by the decedent for the sum of $1,000.00. The in-
strument was addressed to no drawee, contained no words of
negotiability, had no promissory language, and was merely in the
form of an order "Pay to L. O'Rourke - $1,000.00." From the
facts it appeared that the decedent had written the slip of paper
and delivered it to plaintiff, stating in the presence of plaintiff's
husband and daughter, "I am giving her a thousand dollars,
which I think she deserves, because she has been a very good,
faithful saleslady." In affirming the court of appeal it was
held: (1) the instrument could not be enforced as a gift for
failure to meet the requisites of a valid donation mortis causa ;1o
(2) the instrument could not be enforced as a negotiable instru-
knowledge of the agreement of the vendor to purchase insurance from which the
court found "actual" knowledge of the infirmity in the instrument). But query,
did the facts in the Emmon8 case sufficiently establish knowledge of breach of the
vendor's obligation? The Emmons case is subject to criticism on the point. See
Comment, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 322, 331, n. 39 (1958).
7. LA. R.S. 7:20 (1950).
8. C.I.T. Corp. v. Emmons, 197 So. 662 (La. App. 1940). See Comment, 18
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 322, 329-34 (1958), for a discussion of the Louisiana
cases where it is correctly concluded that a finance company with "actual knowl-
edge" of an infirmity should not be permitted to use the Negotiable Instruments
Law as a shield. The strong policy considerations outlined in Sections 52, 56,
and 57 of the NIL, LA. R.S. 7:52, 56, 57 (1950), should not be undermined by
judicial interpretation. The principal instant case, by reaffirming White System
of New Orleans v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So.2d 227 (1951), is more in keeping
with the policy of the statute than the result of the Emmons case.
9. 239 La. 6, 117 So.2d 826 (1960).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1570 (1870). See Succession of Rabasse, 49 La. Ann.
1405, 22 So. 767 (1897).
[Vol. XXI
COMMERICAL LAW
ment because it did not meet the formal requisites of negotiabil-
ity ;"1 and (3) it was not an acknowledgment of a debt so as to
be a charge against the succession because it contained no lan-
guage which would constitute such an acknowledgment.
The question of negotiability, though correctly decided, would
appear to be irrelevant to the disposition of this case, but in de-
clining to apply the doctrine of Barthe v. Succession of Lacroix,12
the Supreme Court placed some emphasis upon the statement
that the Barthe case involved a negotiable instrument given in
recognition of a natural obligation. There is, of course, a clear
distinction between a manual donation of a negotiable instru-
ment where the payee-holder is the donor - which has been sus-
tained under the Civil Code as a manual donation' 3 and the
situation in which the maker's own note not founded upon con-
sideration is attempted to be used to subvert the requirements
of the law as to forms of donations. 14 Although the court specif-
ically stated it was not overruling the Barthe case, it may well be
questioned as to whether or not the principal case does not in
practical effect do so, for the facts as to the consideration do,
contrary to the holding of the court, appear to be quite close to
those of the Barthe case as plaintiff was a long-time employee of
the decedent whom he wished to remunerate under circumstances
strikingly similar to the Barthe case. The correct final result
appears to have been reached because it does not appear that the
facts of this case or the Barthe case warrant the conclusion that
11. LA. R.S. 7:1 (1950) lists the formal requisites of negotiability which were
clearly not complied with. Nor could the instrument be considered a bill of ex-
change, a promissory note, or a check for lack of the requisites defined in id. 7:126,
184, and 185, respectively.
12. 29 La. Ann. 326 (1877) (a promissory note for a certain sum executed by
the decedent payable at the maker's death, although said sum was not legally due
was held not to be a donation in disguise, if it appeared that the note had for its
consideration the natural obligation in favor of the employee, arising out of his
long services to the maker -a case not turning on the negotiability or non-nego-
tiability of the note).
13. Succession of Leroy, 157 La. 1077, 103 So. 328 (1925) (endorsement and
delivery of a check payable to the order of the donor constitutes a valid donation
of the fund represented, though collected after the death of the donor). LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 1539 (1870).
14. Morres v. Compton, 12 Rob. 76 (La. 1845) (parol proof that a promissory
note, payable to the order of the donor, and by him endorsed in blank, was deliv-
ered to plaintiff as a gift, is insufficient to hold it as a gratuitous donation inter
vivos -such a donation must be by an act before a notary and two witnesses) ;
Miller v. Andrus, 1 La. Ann. 237 (1846) (a promissory note made by a father
to the order of his daughter was null as a donation for want of form). Both of
these cases are cited with approval in Succession of Desina, 123 La. 468, 479-80
(1909).
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there was a natural obligation. 15 The case may give rise to diffi-
culty if it be wrongly interpreted as impliedly sanctioning a
gratuitous donation of the maker-donor's own note when clothed
in the form of negotiability.
15. LA. CML CODE art. 1758 (1870). See Note, 7 LouIsIANA LAW REVIEW
445 (1947).
